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On October 12, 1984, Congress enacted 18 USC § 1344,'the Bank
Fraud Act, as part of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984,
in order to protect what the government found was a "strong federal
interest in ... the financial integrity of [federal banking] institutions."2
The statute was enacted to address what Congress saw as increasingly
complex frauds aimed at the nation's financial institutions The Bank
Fraud Act criminalized schemes to defraud or obtain moneys under
false or fraudulent pretenses from federally insured financial institu-
tions. The Act "took a broad[ ] view of criminal conduct and focused
on the overall deceptive activity aimed at [ ] financial institution[s],"'
giving prosecutors a powerful weapon to combat the problem of bank
fraud.'
Aggressive prosecutorial use of the Bank Fraud Act has pro-
duced a substantial body of case law as courts have struggled to define
the elements required for a conviction under § 1344.' In particular,
courts have disagreed about the criminal intent required to sustain a
conviction under § 1344. Specifically, the circuits are divided on
whether the Bank Fraud Act requires the government to prove the
defendant possessed the criminal intent to victimize the institution by
exposing it to a risk of civil liability or financial loss. This Comment
t B.A. 2000, University of Michigan; J.D. 2005, The University of Chicago.
1 Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984 Part G-Bank Fraud, Pub L No 98-473, 98
Stat 2147 (1984), codified at 18 USC § 1344 (2000).
2 Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1983, S Rep No 98-225, 98th Cong, 2d Sess 377
(1983), reprinted in 1984 USCCAN 3182, 3517. See also Steven M. Biskupic, Fine Tuning the
Bank Fraud Statute: A Prosecutor's Perspective, 82 Marq L Rev 381, 382 (1999) (noting that
§ 1344 was enacted in response to the vulnerability of insured financial institutions to certain
criminal "schemes").
3 Biskupic, 82 Marq L Rev at 382 (cited in note 2).
4 18 USC § 1344.
5 Biskupic, 82 Marq L Rev at 383 (cited in note 2).
6 See id at 381 ("[T]he Statute's broadness and flexibility have made it the lead charge for
prosecutors indicting hundreds of white-collar crimes that affect financial institutions each
year."). See also Amitabh Agarwal, Adam Gusman, and James Pyle, Financial Institutions Fraud,
40 Am Crim L Rev 637,654 (2003) ("Because of the financial institution failures of the 1980s, the
federal government has established a comprehensive network of mechanisms to check insider
fraud.").
7 See Barry Tarlow, RICO Report, 25-MAY Champion 50, 60 (May 2001) (discussing
whether intent to harm is a required element for an offense under § 1344(1) or § 1344(2) offense).
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argues that this "risk of loss" requirement should not be considered a
necessary precondition for a conviction of bank fraud.
Part I of this Comment provides the statutory and case law back-
ground of the current circuit split. Part II analyzes the competing ap-
proaches to the risk of loss requirement in an attempt to determine
which method is preferable. This analysis reveals that a new approach
is required. Part II suggests such an approach. By comparing the par-
allel language of the mail and wire fraud statutes to the bank fraud
statute, Part II argues that courts should not require a risk of loss re-
quirement in interpreting § 1344. Part II also examines whether this
understanding of the bank fraud statute comports with congressional
intent and purpose. Finally, this Part addresses objections to an expan-
sive reading of the Bank Fraud Act. These criticisms include the fear
that an expansive approach to bank fraud will federalize crimes best
handled by state and local authorities. This Comment argues that such
criticisms may be overstated and, despite potential drawbacks, the
absence of a risk of loss requirement adequately balances concerns of
federalism by giving prosecutors the flexibility necessary to protect
the nation's financial institutions.
I. THE STATUTORY AND CASE LAW BACKGROUND
A. The Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984
The Bank Fraud Act was passed in its current form as part of the
Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984. Congress passed the
bank fraud statute partly in response to the Supreme Court's 1982
decision in Williams v United States.9 In Williams, the Supreme Court
held that persons who engage in fraudulent schemes, such as check-
kiting,' could not be prosecuted under 18 USC § 1014, the federal
8 Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984 Part G -Bank Fraud, 98 Stat 2147.
9 458 US 279 (1982) (holding that depositing checks not supported by sufficient funds
does not constitute a "false statement or report" under 18 USC § 1014). See also United States v
Doherty, 969 F2d 425, 429 (7th Cir 1992) ("The legislative materials surrounding the passage of
section (1) ... clearly evince Congress' [sic] desire to enact a federal check kiting statute in the
wake of Williams."); S Rep No 98-225 at 377-78 (cited in note 2) (explaining that the "various
gaps in existing statutes" caused by Williams, inter alia, "create a plain need for enactment of the
general bank fraud statute set forth in this part").
10 Check-kiting is the drawing of checks on an account in one bank and depositing them in
an account in a second bank when neither account has sufficient funds to cover the amounts
drawn. Due to the delay created by the collection of funds by one bank from the other, an artifi-
cial balance is created. A simple version of this pattern might involve depositing a worthless
check drawn on a Chicago account in a Los Angeles bank. The Los Angeles account in turn is
used to draw a check that is then deposited in the Chicago bank. The kiter may deposit several
items in this way within a short period of time to give the appearance of substantial balances,
when in fact both accounts may be empty or contain very small amounts. When one of the banks
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provision that criminalized false statements to financial institutions.
The Court reasoned that a person's presentation of a check to a bank
did not constitute a false representation that sufficient funds existed in
the account to cover the check." As a result of Williams, the Justice
Department had to drop a substantial number of white-collar prosecu-
tions that were based on check-kiting charges.
1 2
As Williams weakened federal law, federal authorities began wit-
nessing increasingly complex frauds aimed at the nation's financial
institutions, which the authorities were ill-equipped to handle." Fed-
eral statutes did address specific crimes against banks and other finan-
cial institutions.'4 Most of the time, however, these statutes fell short.
Many federal statutes did not proscribe overall deceptive activity
aimed at financial institutions,5 and instead allowed the government
to pursue prosecutions only in situations where they were able to
prove an element of another federal crime.
16
permits a withdrawal of cash, the kite has succeeded. See Biskupic, 82 Marq L Rev at 382 n 4
(cited in note 2).
11 See Williams, 458 US at 284 ("[T]echnically speaking, a check is not a factual assertion at
all, and therefore cannot be characterized as 'true' or 'false."').
12 S Rep No 98-225 at 378 (cited in note 2) ("As a result of [Williams], the Committee has
been advised by the Justice Department that it has been necessary to cease prosecution of nu-
merous pending check-kiting cases.").
13 Biskupic, 82 Marq L Rev at 382 (cited in note 2). See also S Rep No 98-225 at 379 (cited
in note 2) ("[T]he scope of the present Federal statutes is not sufficient to assure effective prose-
cution of the range of fraudulent crimes commonly committed today against federally controlled
or insured financial institutions."). Federal jurisdiction over crimes committed against federally
controlled and insured financial institutions was recognized by Congress only in its passage of
laws against embezzlement, robbery, larceny, and burglary. See id at 377.
14 Biskupic, 82 Marq L Rev at 382-83 (cited in note 2) (noting that federal law did address
crimes such as "false certification of a check, false bank entries, and false statements on a loan
application.").
15 Id at 382 ("Prior to the enactment of 18 U.S.C. 1344, statutes prohibiting crimes against
financial institutions focused on particular and distinct acts-usually an affirmative false state-
ment.").
16 For example, crimes such as false certification of a check, false bank entries, and false
statements on a loan application were not prosecutable unless the defendant made an affirma-
tively false statement or actual theft of property took place. See Financial Bribery and Fraud
Amendments Act of 1984, HR Rep No 98-901, 98th Cong, 2d Sess 2 (1984) ("Federal banks and
financial institutions are protected against theft and false statements; this protection, however is
incomplete. It does not extend to fraudulent schemes where banks are victims unless the specific
elements of false statement or theft crimes are met."). Congress was worried that the general
bank theft statute did not apply to cases of false pretenses in which there was not a taking and
carrying away of property. See S Rep No 98-225 at 378 (cited in note 2) (noting a recent case
where the general bank theft statute "'[did] not apply to a case of false pretenses in which there
is not a taking and carrying away' of the property."). See also Bell v United States, 462 US 356,
361 (1983) (holding that the general bank theft statute, 18 USC § 2113 (2000), is not limited to
common law larceny and does reach certain offenses involving the obtaining of property from
banks by false pretenses, but "does not apply to a case of false pretenses in which there is not a
taking and carrying away" of the property). It is worth noting that state prosecution was avail-
able for many of the crimes directed against financial institutions, including check-kiting. How-
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The existing gaps in federal law, as well as the lack of a unitary
provision aimed at the problem of bank fraud, forced Congress to de-
velop a better approach to combat crimes against federally insured
financial institutions.'7 The Bank Fraud Act was drafted with those
needs in mind.'8
At stake was what Congress termed the "financial integrity" of the
nation's federally insured banking institutions. 9 White collar schemes
such as check-kiting were costing the United States hundreds of mil-
lions of dollars a year. Additionally, the threat of bank fraud was no
longer a state or local matter: "Financial transactions [were] becoming
increasingly integrated and complex as ... financial instruments [were]
securitized and traded on the national and global markets."2'
But even beyond these monetary losses, Congress was also con-
cerned about general instances of fraud where a bank was victimized,"
regardless of the resulting loss to the institution.3 The financial integ-
rity and vitality of the banking system depended upon the ability of
the federal government to prosecute any type of fraud directed at fed-
erally backed financial institutions.
ever, Congress had a strong federal interest in protecting financial institutions which were organ-
ized or operating under federal law and whose deposits were federally insured. See S Rep No 98-
225 at 377 (cited in note 2). See also Federal Response to Criminal Misconduct By Bank Officers,
Directors, and Insiders, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Commerce, Consumer and Mone-
tary Affairs of the House Committee on Government Operations, 98th Cong, 1st Sess 168 (1983)
(statement of John C. Keeney, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division) (describ-
ing the "limited" application of current federal statutes).
17 See S Rep No 98-225 at 378 (cited in note 2).
18 See text accompanying note 5.
19 S Rep No 98-225 at III (cited in note 2).
20 In fiscal year 1982 alone, "loss[es] to financial institutions on account of fraud and em-
bezzlement exceeded $440 million, almost ten times the $46.8 million lost through bank robber-
ies." 98th Cong, 1st Sess 168 (1983) (statement of John C. Keeney) (cited in note 16). As the
Department of Justice official noted, federal criminal cases arising out of recent bank failures in
New York and California had an "enormous impact on the nation's banking system." Id. More
troubling were the more frequent but "less-publicized violations involving [ ] smaller monetary
losses.... [In fiscal year 1982 alone,] federal prosecutor[s] secured [over 2,000] convictions for
banking violations" -320 involving "cases where the monetary amount [ ] exceeded $100,000."
Id.
21 United States v Brandon, 17 F3d 409, 427 (1st Cir 1994) (affirming defendants' convic-
tions for bank fraud and conspiracy to commit bank fraud for various fraudulent misrepresenta-
tions made to obtain loan financing).
22 98th Cong, 1st Sess 174 (1983) (statement of John C. Keeney) (cited in note 16) ("En-
actment of [the bank fraud statute] would greatly assist our efforts to prosecute offenders who
victimize the banking system.").
23 HR Rep 98-901 at 2 (cited in note 16) (citing insider trading as an example of an act that
should be prosecutable even if there is no resulting loss to the institution).
The Bank Fraud Act: A Risk of Loss Requirement?
The Bank Fraud Act was modeled after the mail and wire fraud
statutes, which courts had broadly construed to tackle a wide variety
of criminal enterprises.4 The Bank Fraud Act currently provides that:
Whoever knowingly executes or attempts to execute, a scheme or
artifice (1) to defraud a financial institution; or (2) to obtain any
of the moneys, funds, credits, assets, securities, or other property
owned by, or under the custody or control of, a financial institu-
tion, by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations,
or promises; shall be fined not more than $1,000,000 or impris-
oned not more than 30 years, or both."
Facially, the statute provides two alternate means of tackling
bank fraud. The two prongs of § 1344 operate independently; prosecu-
tors may bring a charge of bank fraud under either section.2' Each sec-
tion serves a different purpose-section (1) "focuses on the conduct as
it affects the financial institution," while section (2) "emphasizes the
conduct of the defendant."27
B. The Circuit Split
Despite its narrow beginnings as a reaction to the Court's deci-
sion in Williams, the Bank Fraud Act now reaches a wide variety of
fraudulent schemes beyond those initially considered. The expansive
use of the statute has produced a troubling four-sided circuit split. The
question courts have grappled with is whether under both § 1344(1)
24 S Rep No 98-225 at 378 (cited in note 2).
25 18 USC § 1344.
26 Most jurisdictions treat sections (1) and (2) independently. See, for example, United
States v Dennis, 237 F3d 1295, 1303 (11th Cir 2001) ("A conviction can be sustained under either
[§ 1344(1) or § 1344(2)] when the indictment ... charge[s] both clauses."); United States v Ponec,
163 F3d 486,488 (8th Cir 1998) (finding that the plain meaning of § 1344 indicates that Congress
set out two separate ways in which bank fraud could be committed under the statute). But see
United States v Thomas, 315 F3d 190, 196-98 (3d Cir 2002) (concluding that section (2) does not
set forth an independent basis of liability but rather "underscores the breadth" of section (1)). In
order to sustain a conviction under § 1344, the government must show that the defendant: (1)
acted knowingly; (2) to execute or attempt to execute; (3) a scheme or artifice to either (a) de-
fraud, or (b) obtain moneys of a financial institution by false or fraudulent pretenses a financial
institutions 18 USC § 1344. Most courts have not held that the risk of loss requirement goes to
the elements of the crime but rather have held that a showing of a risk of loss is necessary to
prove the specific intent of the crime. See Part I.B. But see United States v Jacobs, 117 F3d 82, 91
(2d Cir 1997) (finding that an actual or potential risk of loss is one of the required elements for
conviction of bank fraud).
27 United States v Sapp, 53 F3d 1100,1103 (10th Cir 1995).
28 Biskupic, 82 Marq L Rev at 382-83 (cited in note 2). See also Agarwal, Gusman, and
Pyle, 40 Am Crim L Rev at 640-41 (cited in note 6) (finding instances where the bank fraud
statute has been used to target check forging, false statements and non-disclosures on loan appli-
cations, stolen checks, student loan fraud, automobile title fraud, credit card fraud, and false
statements intended to induce check cashing, among others).
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and §1344(2), prosecutors must show that the defendant exposed a
bank to a "risk of loss" in order to establish the requisite specific in-
tent for bank fraud. That is to say, did the defendant expose the bank
to an actual or potential risk of financial loss or civil liability?29 Courts
have taken four positions in response to this question. First, some cir-
cuits find a risk of loss requirement necessary under section (1) of
§ 1344 but not section (2). 0 Second, some circuits come to the exact
opposite conclusion; they find a risk of loss requirement under section
(2) but not section (1).31 Third, a number of circuits have found that
neither section (1) nor section (2) requires the government to show
the bank was exposed to an actual or potential risk of financial loss or
civil liability.32 Finally, one circuit requires that the government estab-
lish a risk of loss showing under both section (1) and section (2)."3
To simplify the discussion, this Comment has grouped this multi-
faceted debate into two different approaches. The risk of loss ap-
proach ("loss approach") refers to those situations where circuit
courts have required that the prosecution show a risk of loss for con-
viction under either section (1) or (2) of § 13447' The totality of the
circumstances approach ("totality approach") refers to those situa-
tions where circuit courts have held that a risk of loss requirement is
not required to sustain a conviction under either subsection of § 1344.
This approach suggests that courts should look to the totality of the
defendant's actions to determine if he or she acted with the requisite
intent to commit bank fraud. This Comment will argue that the total-
ity approach is the proper way in which courts should interpret the
Bank Fraud Act.
29 This is the definition of "risk of loss" accepted by most jurisdictions. See, for example,
United States v Briggs, 965 F2d 10, 12-13 (5th Cir 1992) (defining risk of loss as a bank's exposure
to civil liability). Some courts have gone so far as to argue a risk of loss may refer to economic
loss faced by a lack of funds that would hamper a bank's normal lending operations, though this
is not a definition accepted by most jurisdictions. See, for example, United States v Everett, 270
F3d 986, 990-91 (6th Cir 2001) (stating that risk of loss is not required, but, if it were, it would
"almost inevitably" be present anytime the bank had even incidental involvement in the fraud
scheme, even if the bank was not the victim).
30 See Part I.B.l.a.
31 See Part I.B.l.b.
32 See Part I.B.2.
33 See United States v McCauley, 253 F3d 815, 819-20 (5th Cir 2001) (employing separate
and different analyses for § 1344(1) and § 1344(2) and requiring the government to show the
bank was faced with a risk of loss under both sections).
34 Due to concerns of brevity, the Fifth Circuit's position in McCauley is not discussed
separately. However, the question of whether a risk of loss is required under section (1) and
section (2) is adequately addressed. See Parts I.B.l.a-b.
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1. The loss approach.
a) A risk of loss is required under § 1344(1). Six circuits have held
that a conviction under § 1344(1) requires a risk of loss showing. For
example, in United States v Stavroulakis," the Second Circuit took an
in-depth look at the Bank Fraud Act and whether a risk of loss re-
quirement was necessary for section (1). Stavroulakis was convicted
of, among other things, selling stolen checks to an undercover federal
agent." The Second Circuit affirmed his conviction, holding that, for a
conviction under the "scheme to defraud" language of section (1), the
prosecution needed to prove that the defendant acted in a deceitful
manner toward the financial institution, "with the intent to victimize
the institution by exposing it to an actual or potential loss."37 Other
circuits have followed suit.8 In United States v Lemons,3" the Fifth Cir-
cuit upheld a conviction under § 1344(1) against a defendant who was
convicted of depositing checks with forged endorsements. The court
held that had the endorsement been challenged, the bank that ac-
cepted the check would be at risk of financial loss." In addition, a bank
could incur civil liability for distributing customer funds to an unau-
thorized party.4' In either situation, the bank could be exposed to a risk
of loss, a necessary precondition for a bank fraud conviction. '
b) A risk of loss is required under § 1344(2). The risk of loss re-
quirement has been adopted for convictions under § 1344(2) as well.
In United States v Davis, 4 the defendant, Davis, obtained a refund
check from the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) by allegedly submit-
ting a false federal income tax return in the name of another individ-
ual." Davis opened a bank account in order to deposit the fraudu-
lently obtained funds, and was subsequently convicted of bank fraud
35 952 F2d 686 (2d Cir 1992).
36 Id at 693.
37 Id at 694.
38 See, for example, United States v Wilkinson, 137 F3d 214, 232 (4th Cir 1998) (Hamilton
concurring) (explaining that to convict under § 1344(1), the government must prove that the
financial institution was placed at risk of an actual or potential loss). See also Thomas, 315 F3d at
201 (holding that "mere deceptive conduct" is not enough); Sapp, 53 F3d at 1102 (finding a risk
of loss showing is required for a conviction under section (1) but not section (2)); Brandon, 17
F3d at 426 (requiring a risk of loss finding under § 1344(1)).
39 941 F2d 309 (5th Cir 1991).
40 Id at 316.
41 Id.
42 Id at 316 n 3 (approving of the jury instructions used by the district court, which stated
that "the Government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant's scheme and
artifice, if any, placed one or both of the banks at a risk of loss and that neither of the two banks
knowingly accepted such a risk").
43 989 F2d 244 (7th Cir 1993).
44 Idat246.
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under § 1344(2)." The Seventh Circuit reversed the conviction. ' Al-
though Davis may have made false representations to the bank in or-
der to withdraw the funds from the account, "[tihere was no way in
which the fraud could have endangered the [financial institution]."' 7
After a thorough examination of the Uniform Commercial Code and
an Illinois state revenue statute,' The court concluded that the bank
was not exposed to a risk of civil liability or loss. 9 The purpose of the
Bank Fraud Act, the court reasoned, was "not to protect people who
write checks to con artists but to protect the federal government's
interest as an insurer of financial institutions."' In this case, the real
target of the fraud was the IRS, not the bank," and thus the defendant
could not possess the criminal intent required to bring about a convic-
tion under § 1344(2).Several other circuit courts have also considered the risk of loss
question under § 1344(2) and have come to the same conclusion.52 In
United States v Briggs,"5 the Fifth Circuit adopted a risk of loss re-
quirement to sustain a conviction under § 1344(2)- where the defen-
dant perpetrated a scheme to illegally transfer more than $5 million."
The court affirmed her conviction. By succumbing to her fraudulent
scheme, the bank faced a heightened threat of civil liability, a neces-
sary harm for a conviction under § 1344(2)."
2. The totality approach.
The totality approach takes the opposite view of both § 1344(1)
and § 1344(2). The Sixth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits have all held
45 Id.
46 Idat247.
47 Id.
48 Id. The court cites UCC §§ 3-305(b), 3-306 (ALI 2002), and Ill Rev Stat ch 26, 3-
305(b), 306, as well as Northwestern National Insurance Co v Maggio, 976 F2d 320 (7th Cir 1992),
to illustrate the point that the bank would not have been held civilly liable since it was a holder
in due course of the IRS's check and thus "took free of any defenses that the IRS might have
had to a suit by the payee (Williams)." Davis, 989 F2d at 247.
49 Davis, 989 F2d at 247.
50 Id at 246-47.
51 Id at 247 ("He may well have committed fraud against the [IRS] .... But only in the
most literal, hypertechnical sense could he be said to have schemed to defraud the bank of
money or other property belonging to it.").
52 See United States v Ponec, 163 F3d 486,488 (8th Cir 1998) ("Paragraph (2) of the statute
refers to a scheme to obtain monies or other property of a financial institution.... [Slome loss to
the institution, or at least an attempt to cause a loss, appears to be required.").
53 965 F2d 10 (5th Cir 1992).
54 Id at 12-13.
55 Id at 11.
56 Id at 12-13 ("Although the record does not disclose whether the banks were ever threat-
ened with a civil action ... [the defendant's] conduct clearly put those institutions at risk.").
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that a risk of loss requirement is not necessary for conviction under
either section (1) or section (2). The Sixth Circuit used the totality ap-
proach to analyze § 1344(1) in United States v Hoglund." The defen-
dant was an attorney convicted of settling his clients' cases without
their permission and forging their signatures on settlement checks for
his deposit.8 The court held that a risk of loss requirement was not
necessary to sustain a conviction under § 1344(1) but was merely one
way of establishing intent to defraud. 9 The Ninth and Eleventh Cir-
cuits have also endorsed this view.'
What is therefore required to establish specific intent under
§ 1344(1)? The Ninth Circuit found that intent to defraud can be es-
tablished by looking at the structure of the financial transaction.'I
Other jurisdictions that also have refused to find a risk of loss re-
quirement under § 1344(1) have held that the specific intent to de-
fraud a bank can be established by circumstantial evidence such as the
defendant's actions or the scheme itself.62
Courts have also used the totality approach in analyzing
§ 1344(2). In United States v McNeil," the defendant was convicted of
bank fraud for engaging in identity theft in order to file fraudulent tax
returns and then depositing the fraudulent returns at a national bank.6
In affirming the conviction, the Ninth Circuit conducted a thorough
examination of the text and legislative history of § 1344 and sharply
disagreed with the Seventh Circuit's analysis of § (2).5 Examination of
state commercial law in order to determine liability was unworkable,
the Ninth Circuit reasoned, since it was too difficult for courts to make
"liability ... turn on the correct application of state commercial law
and possible subsequent state-court adjudication."' Instead of looking
for a potential risk of loss, the court held that the specific intent
needed to establish a bank fraud conviction could be shown by exam-
ining the scheme itself. McNeil misrepresented himself to the bank by
57 178 F3d 410 (6th Cir 1999).
58 Id at 412.
59 Idat413.
60 See United States v De La Mata, 266 F3d 1275, 1298 (11th Cir 2001) ("[W]e believe that
'risk of loss' is merely one way of establishing intent to defraud in bank fraud cases."); United
States v Wolfswinkel, 44 F3d 782, 786 (9th Cir 1995) (finding the bank was exposed to a risk of
loss but such a requirement has never been necessary to sustain a conviction under § 1344(1)).
61 United States v Molinaro, 11 F3d 853,857 (9th Cir 1993).
62 See, for example, United States v Lamarre, 248 F3d 642,649 (7th Cir 2001).
63 320 F3d 1034 (9th Cir 2003).
64 Id at 1036 (upholding a § 1344(2) conviction for opening a bank account in the name of
another person, submitting a false tax form for that person, and receiving a direct deposit refund
from the IRS into the fraudulent bank account).
65 Id at 1037.
66 Id at 1038.
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opening and depositing moneys under a false name. 67 His actions were
enough to establish the criminal intent element of fraud, even though
the bank turned out to be an incidental player in McNeil's overall
scheme to defraud the IRS.6 The specific intent required under
§ 1344(2) could be established by looking at the totality of the circum-
stances.6' The overall scheme to defraud satisfied the specific intent
requirement under § 1344(2). °
II. INTERPRETATIVE GUIDANCE: How STRUCTURAL SIMILARITIES
WITH THE MAIL AND WIRE FRAUD ACTS HELP TO INTERPRET § 1344
In trying to determine if a risk of loss requirement exists under
§ 1344, courts have traditionally looked to the statute's text to estab-
lish its plain meaning. The absence of explicit language requiring a risk
of loss seems to suggest such a requirement is unnecessary. Textual
arguments for and against a risk of loss requirement have left courts
divided and the issue unresolved. This Comment suggests a different
approach to determine the proper interpretation of the Bank Fraud
Act.
Congress modeled the Bank Fraud Act after the wire and mail
fraud acts.71 Though many courts have acknowledged the obvious simi-
larities between the statutes,7 they have consistently ignored the wire
and mail fraud statutes in their analyses of the Bank Fraud Act, in
particular the risk of loss requirement. This Part argues that the simi-
67 Id at 1039-40.
68 Id at 1040.
69 Id. See also United States v Mason, 902 F2d 1434, 1443 (9th Cir 1990) ("Intent to defraud
may be established by circumstantial evidence.").
70 Again, other courts have followed suit. See Sapp, 53 F3d at 1102 (finding that a risk of
loss requirement was unnecessary for § 1344(2) since "clause (1) focuses on the [defendant's]
conduct as it affects the financial institution, while clause (2) emphasizes the conduct of the
defendant.") See also United States v Everett, 270 F3d 986, 991 (6th Cir 2001) (holding that a risk
of loss or civil liability is not necessary for a conviction under § 1344(2)). In Everett, the defen-
dant issued checks payable in her name and then deposited the funds in her personal bank ac-
count. Id at 988. While finding that a risk of loss requirement was not necessary, the court also
noted that even if such a showing was needed under § 1344(2), it could easily be satisfied since
"causing a bank to transfer funds pursuant to a fraudulent scheme reduces the funds the bank
has available for its loans ... inevitably [causing] it some loss." Id at 990-91. Thus, the Sixth Cir-
cuit suggests that even if a risk of loss is required, any type of bank fraud will, at the very least,
affect the victim bank's level of deposits and thus trigger a "loss." Compare Davis, 989 F2d at
246-47 (finding no liability in a similar situation where the defendant tricked a third party into
endorsing the IRS refund check).
71 See S Rep No 98-225 at 378 (cited in note 2).
72 See United States v Mason, 902 F2d 1434, 1441 (9th Cir 1990) ("[T]he bank fraud statute
directly tracks or is parallel to the mail and wire fraud statutes."). See also United States v
Blackmon, 839 F2d 900, 906 (2d Cir 1988) (noting that "the House Judiciary Committee, in con-
sidering the proposed bank fraud statute, was particularly concerned about the case law devel-
opment of federal jurisdiction under the mail fraud... and wire fraud ... statutes").
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larities between the statutes shed new light on how courts should in-
terpret both § 1344(1) and § 1344(2).
First, this Part notes the problems created by the current textual
analysis of § 1344. The statute's lack of clarity has left courts divided
on how best to analyze the text, as neither the totality approach nor
the loss approach offers any clear answers. Second, this Part seeks to
demonstrate why the mail and wire fraud acts should guide the inter-
pretation of the Bank Fraud Act. Because Congress felt that the Bank
Fraud Act should be interpreted in the same manner as the mail and
wire fraud acts, the historical underpinnings of the statutes and their
modern-day interpretations are important in understanding the Bank
Fraud Act's intended meaning. Third, this Part will use the interpreta-
tive guidance provided by the mail and wire fraud acts to analyze
whether the Bank Fraud Act has a risk of loss requirement. Ulti-
mately, the similarities between the statutes provide a broad base of
support for the totality approach: the Bank Fraud Act does not re-
quire the government to prove the victim bank was exposed to a risk
of loss or civil liability. Finally, this Part will interpret the totality ap-
proach in light of the legislative intent and purposes behind the stat-
ute, addressing, in the end, whether the suggested method is a compel-
ling alternative to the loss approach.
A. Textual Approaches to § 1344
To determine if § 1344 has a risk of loss requirement, the first step
is to look at the text of the Bank Fraud Act. On its face, § 1344(1) does
not include a risk of loss requirement. Instead, it employs the term
"scheme ... to defraud,"" a phrase that courts have found vague and
imprecise.4 The ambiguity of the "scheme to defraud" language has
made the risk of loss inquiry difficult for courts. How do courts show
that the defendant had the specific intent "to defraud?" Do courts
need to show the bank was exposed to a risk of loss by a defendant's
actions or can a prosecutor just show that the defendant engaged in
deceptive activity toward the bank? Unfortunately, the text does not
offer a clear answer to these questions.
The totality approach focuses on the defendant's deceptive con-
duct toward the bank. Under this approach, courts look to whether
the defendant acted willfully against the bank with the specific intent
73 18 USC § 1344.
74 United States v Goldblatt, 813 F2d 619,624 (3d Cir 1987) (noting the imprecise nature of
the term "scheme to defraud," and relying more on "whether the scheme demonstrated a depar-
ture from fundamental honesty, moral uprightness, or fair play and candid dealings in the general
life of the community").
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to deceive or cheat the institution, usually to financially benefit him-
self or cause financial loss to another. This approach seems to be a
sensible way to read the "scheme to defraud" language of § 1344(1)
and has been adopted by the Seventh Circuit.7' According to the Sev-
enth Circuit's reading of § 1344(1), the defendant need not expose the
bank to a risk of loss or civil liability, but must act with the specific
intent to cheat the bank for his or her own personal gain." Often the
"gain" the defendant receives is the use of the bank's services to fur-
ther his or her scheme. Crimes such as money laundering fit nicely
under this interpretation; the bank would not necessarily be exposed
to a risk of loss but the defendant would still have acted with the spe-
cific intent necessary to commit fraud upon the financial institution.
Although prosecutors could show the bank faced a risk of loss to es-
tablish this level of intent," it could also be established by circumstan-
tial evidence and inferences drawn from the scheme itself, which is
what the totality approach advocates."'
The totality approach to § 1344(1) has not been universally ac-
cepted. Some courts have argued that in light of the fact that section
(1) "focuses on the conduct as it affects the financial institution" while
section (2) "emphasizes the conduct of the defendant,"'9 a bank is only
"defrauded" under section (1) if it faces a risk of loss or civil liability.
The Second Circuit in Stavroulakis argued that § 1344(1)'s "scheme to
defraud" clause "requires that the defendant engage ... in a pattern or
course of conduct designed to deceive a federally chartered or insured
financial institution into releasing property, with the intent to victim-
ize the institution by exposing it to actual or potential loss.""
This reading of section (1) does not seem to fit with the plain
meaning of the statute, especially when one looks to the entire statute.
Section (2) of the Bank Fraud Act proscribes schemes "to obtain any
of the moneys" owned or under control of the bank. Thus, it seems
more likely that under section (1), only a specific intent to defraud is
needed, not an actual loss or even a potential risk of loss. Instead, as
the Hoglund court noted, a risk of loss may be used to help establish
the specific intent to defraud, but it is not a sine qua non." Despite
these persuasive arguments, advocates of the loss approach are not
convinced: unless the bank is exposed to a risk of loss, it has not been
75 United States v Moede, 48 F3d 238,241 (7th Cir 1995).
76 See United States v Lamarre, 248 F3d 642,649 (7th Cir 2001).
77 See Hoglund, 178 F3d at 413.
78 Lamarre, 248 F3d at 649.
79 United States v Sapp, 53 F3d 1100, 1103 (10th Cir 1995).
80 952 F2d at 694.
81 178 F3d at 413.
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defrauded. Proponents of this approach continue to press prosecutors
to show a risk of loss in order to sustain a conviction under § 1344(1).
What about § 1344(2)? Does the text of the Bank Fraud Act offer
a clear answer to whether a risk of loss showing is required under sec-
tion (2)? Like section (1) of § 1344, section (2) does not mention a risk
of loss requirement. Instead, the statute criminalizes any attempt or
"scheme ... to obtain any of the moneys ... owned by, or under the
custody or control of a financial institution."" The absence of any ex-
plicit language requiring a risk of loss again seems to suggest that such
a requirement is unnecessary.
Advocates of the loss approach disagree and read the "obtain any
of the moneys" language in § 1344(2) as a requirement that the bank
be faced with a real risk of having its funds stolen. Otherwise, they
argue, use of the federal statute would federalize crimes that are typi-
cally prosecuted at the local level, such as the writing of bad checks.
Such a result, though unintended, may not be troublesome. Though no
court has read the bank fraud statute as a federal law against bad
checks," it is distinctly possible Congress wanted to give prosecutors a
jurisdictional hook to reach crimes that were becoming increasingly
federal in nature. In either case, advocates of the loss approach argue
that courts should still develop a limiting principle so as not to allow
federal prosecution of crimes where banks are not truly victimized, a
result, they argue, that would extend beyond congressional intent.-
In response, proponents of the totality approach argue that a risk
of loss requirement is especially unwarranted because the statute
criminalizes "attempts" at bank fraud. A risk of loss requirement could
create a paradox where attempted bank frauds are prosecuted, but
actual bank frauds that do not endanger the bank are not. It seems
82 18 USC § 1344(2).
83 See United States v Orr, 932 F2d 330, 332 (4th Cir 1991) (finding that Congress did not
intend the bank fraud statute to cover ordinary state law offenses, where the fraud victim was
not a federally insured bank).
84 Indeed, in McNeil the defendant was convicted not of exposing the bank to any form of
risk of loss, but instead of defrauding the IRS. By all accounts, it seems as though the bank was
an incidental player in the scheme. Even if, as the Ninth Circuit held, McNeil violated the bank
fraud statute by misrepresenting himself as the John Doe when opening the bank account, it
does not follow that this would be a legitimate reason for prosecuting him for bank fraud when
other state remedies might exist such as identity theft law. McNeil, 320 F3d at 1037 ("[Blank
fraud charges may lie even if the bank is not the immediate or sole victim of the defendant's
conduct."). See also Sapp, 53 F3d at 1102 ("[V]ictimizing a bank is . . . 'not necessary under
§ 1344(2)."'), quoting United States v Young, 952 F2d 1252, 1256 n 4 (10th Cir 1991). But see
United States v Thomas, 315 F3d 190, 198 (3d Cir 2002) ("Thus, to take money in the custody of a
bank is not a crime under the statute unless there is a concomitant intent to victimize the
bank."). In addition, according to the Senate Report on the Comprehensive Crime Control Act
of 1984, the legislation was enacted to assure "a basis for Federal prosecution of those who vic-
timize these banks through fraudulent schemes." See S Rep No 98-225 at 377 (cited in note 2).
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unreasonable to require prosecutors to show that banks were exposed
to a risk of loss, when often they can only ascertain a risk of loss after
an attempt is executed. A risk of loss requirement for a scheme in its
infancy could invalidate legitimate prosecutions.
Such concerns may be overstated. Attempts can still expose banks
to a potential risk of loss. A risk of loss requirement may strike a bet-
ter balance, criminalizing only those attempts that are serious enough
to expose the bank to a risk of financial liability. These types of at-
tempts are more dangerous since they are more likely to threaten the
financial integrity of the banking system.
Both sides of this debate have offered persuasive arguments for
and against a risk of loss requirement. Unfortunately, a purely textual
approach does not clearly resolve the risk of loss issue. To determine
whether a risk of loss should be required under § 1344, this Comment
suggests looking at an alternative mode of interpretation.
B. Statutory Analogs: Section 1344 and the Mail and Wire Fraud Acts
The legislative history of the Bank Fraud Act explicitly states that
the statute was modeled after the mail and wire fraud statutes.85 In-
deed, Congress intended the courts to interpret the Bank Fraud Act in
the same manner as the mail and wire fraud acts," and specifically
"endors[ed] the current interpretations of [those statutes]."" There-
fore, a proper next step in interpreting the Bank Fraud Act is to look
to how courts have interpreted the mail and wire fraud statutes. The
risk of loss debate currently lacks guidance from these acts. Though
many courts have acknowledged the obvious similarities between
these statutes, these courts generally do not give sufficient weight to
these similarities, particularly when deciding whether the bank fraud
statute requires a risk of loss."
85 See S Rep No 98-225 at 378 (cited in note 2).
86 HR Rep No 98-901 at 4 (cited in note 16) ("The section thus parallels the language of
the current mail fraud and wire fraud statute ('scheme to defraud'), and is intended to incorpo-
rate case law interpretations of those sections.").
87 Id. Although the scope of the statutes is currently greater than that intended by Con-
gress, it did not anticipate any further expansion of both statutes. It is worth noting that the
totality approach had been used by courts prior to the passage of the Bank Fraud Act and thus
would not necessarily be considered an expansive reading. See United States v Bohonus, 628 F2d
1167 (9th Cir 1980) (holding that the specific intent to defraud can be found by examining the
scheme itself); United States v Vasilios, 598 F2d 387, 392 (5th Cir 1979) (upholding a finding of
specific intent by examining the defendant's scheme to defraud where he made false representa-
tions); United States v Bush, 522 F2d 641, 648-49 (7th Cir 1975) (finding an intent to defraud by
examining the course of the defendant's conduct).
88 Mason, 902 F2d at 1441 (noting that the Bank Fraud Act "directly tracks or is parallel to
the mail and wire fraud statutes"). The court in Mason also noted that "the legislative history
expresses the congressional intent that the bank fraud statute receive the same broad scope as
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Like the Bank Fraud Act, both the mail and wire fraud statutes
proscribe the conduct of executing or attempting to execute a scheme
or artifice to take the property of another "by means of false or
fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises."'" The Mail Fraud
Act provides:
Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or ar-
tifice to defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of
false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises . . .
places in any post office or authorized depository for mail matter,
any matter or thing whatever to be sent or delivered by the
Postal Service ... shall be fined not more than $1,000,000 or im-
prisoned not more than 30 years, or both.O
The statutory language of the Wire Fraud Act, itself modeled af-
ter the Mail Fraud Act, is very similar, and punishes:
any scheme or artifice to defraud, or for obtaining money or prop-
erty by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or
promises, transmits or causes to be transmitted by means of wire,
radio, or television communication in interstate or foreign com-
merce.
The Bank Fraud Act includes parallel language to that used by
the other two statutes and makes it a crime to execute or attempt to
execute:
a scheme or artifice (1) to defraud a financial institution; or (2) to
obtain any of the moneys, funds, credits, assets, securities, or other
property owned by, or under the custody or control of, a financial
institution, by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representa-
tions, or promises."
Comparing the language of these statutes can shed light on the
congressional intent behind the Bank Fraud Act. First, Congress's
choice of words was purposeful. This language is a strong indication
that Congress envisioned that the bank fraud statute would be inter-
preted in the same vein as the mail and wire fraud acts; otherwise they
would have used different statutory terms. Similarity of language be-
the mail and wire fraud statutes." Id. In reading this language, courts that have adopted the loss
approach may not be necessarily ignoring congressional intent, but instead understand this lan-
guage to mean only that the bank fraud act be used to tackle a wide variety of fraudulent
schemes.
89 See Mail Fraud Act, 18 USC § 1341 (2000); Wire Fraud Act, 18 USC § 1343 (2000).
90 18 USC § 1341 (emphasis added).
91 18 USC § 1343 (emphasis added).
92 18 USC § 1344.
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tween statutes is a strong indication that the statutes should be inter-
preted pari passu.93 This presumption is especially strong if the words
are part of the same body of law, such as the federal criminal code."
The statutory enactment history, encompassed in the House and
Senate Reports, also provides courts with guidance from Congress on
how to interpret the wire and mail fraud statutes. The House Commit-
tee noted that they "intended to incorporate case law interpretations"
of the wire and mail fraud acts through the language of the Bank
Fraud Act.95 Although Congress recognized the expansive interpreta-
tions used by the courts in construing the wire and mail fraud stat-
utes,9 it still "modeled [the bank fraud statute] on the present wire and
mail fraud statutes which [are] construed by the courts to reach a wide
range of fraudulent activity. '
How do the courts view the mail and wire fraud statutes? The
mail and wire fraud statutes are powerful prosecutorial tools. Prosecu-
tors refer to the statutes as the Colt 45 of federal law enforcement."8
Originally enacted to protect people from schemes to deprive them of
their money or property,9 the courts have found an increasingly wide
93 See Northcross v Memphis Board of Education, 412 US 427, 428 (1973) (holding that
two attorney-fee provisions in federal statutes should be interpreted similarly due to their similar
language, especially if they share a common purpose). See also West Virginia University Hospi-
tals, Inc v Casey, 499 US 83, 87-101 (1991) (interpreting a statute authorizing prevailing parties
to recover attorney's fees by examining the text of many other statutes); Community for Creative
Non-Violence v Reid, 490 US 730,739-40 (1989) (holding that "[w]here Congress uses terms that
have accumulated settled meaning under ... the common law, a court must infer, unless the
statute otherwise dictates, that Congress means to incorporate the established meaning of these
terms"). This is not an absolute rule and readily yields to other indicia of congressional intent.
See Atlantic Cleaners & Dyers, Inc v United States, 286 US 427, 433 (1932). Here, the totality
approach, which is supported by the use of mail and wire fraud acts, is in line with congressional
intent. See Part II.D.1.
94 See Lorillard v Pons, 434 US 575 (1978) (holding that a familial relationship between
statutes provides a strong indication that newer statutes should be interpreted consistently with
older statutes upon which they were modeled). See also William N. Eskridge, et al, Cases and
Materials on Legislation: Statutes and the Creation of Public Policy 1049 (American Casebook 3d
ed 2001) ("Reasoning from statutes in pari materia (similar statutes) generally has greater force
when the statutes are all in the same jurisdiction.").
95 HR Rep No 98-901 at 4 (cited in note 16).
96 Id.
97 S Rep No 98-225 at 378 (cited in note 2).
98 As one former prosecutor noted:
To federal prosecutors of white collar crime, the mail fraud statute is our Stradivarius, our
Colt 45, our Louisville Slugger, our Cuisinart- and our true love. We may flirt with RICO,
show off with 10b-5, and call the conspiracy law "darling," but we always come home to the
virtues of 18 U.S.C. § 1341, with its simplicity, adaptability, and comfortable familiarity.
Jed S. Rakoff, The Federal Mail Fraud Statute (Part 1), 18 Duquesne L Rev 771,771 (1980) (inter-
nal citations omitted).
99 The mail fraud statute was initially enacted in 1872 as a measure to protect the postal
service against "frauds which are mostly gotten up in the large cities ... by thieves, forgers, and
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range of activities punishable by the statutes. The statutes cover the
full range of consumer frauds, stock frauds, land frauds, insurance
frauds, and commodity frauds, as well as crimes such as blackmail,
counterfeiting, election fraud, bribery, money laundering and racket-
eering.' ° Over time, courts have come to view both statutes as stop-
gap provisions that provide a "first line of defense" against innovative
frauds, that is, until Congress enacts more specific legislation.' 1
Congress endorsed this liberal interpretation of the Bank Fraud
Act.'°2 Although Congress may not have anticipated any further ex-
pansive interpretations of the mail and wire fraud acts, it did not seek
to cabin the reach of the Bank Fraud Act in any appreciable way. It is
clear that Congress crafted the language of the Bank Fraud Act in the
hope that the statute would receive the same broad construction as
the mail and wire fraud statutes and reach a wide range of fraudulent
activity.
C. Use of the Mail and Wire Fraud Statutes Provides Support for the
Totality Approach
Elemental analysis of the wire and mail fraud statutes seems to
indicate that the statutes generally apply in any instance where the
mails, or wires, are used in furtherance of a scheme to defraud. 3
Courts have traditionally followed the common law definition of fraud
and read into the statute an additional element requiring the defen-
dant to have the specific intent to defraud."' Showing the existence of
a scheme "reasonably calculated to deceive persons of ordinary pru-
dence and comprehension" satisfies the requirement of specific intent
under either statute.'5 This intention can readily be shown by examin-
rapscallions generally, for the purpose of deceiving and fleecing the innocent people in the coun-
try." McNally v United States, 483 US 350,356 (1987), quoting Rep. John F Farnsworth, in Cong
Globe, 41st Cong, 3d Sess, 35 (1870).
100 Nirav Shah, Mail and Wire Fraud, 40 Am Crim L Rev 825,826 (2003).
101 United States v Maze, 414 US 395,405-06 (1974) (Burger dissenting).
102 See notes 154-55 and accompanying text.
103 Since the mail and wire fraud statutes share the same language in relevant parts, the
same analysis applies to each. See 18 USC §§ 1341, 1343; Carpenter v United States, 484 US 19,25
n 6 (1987). See also United Sates v Welch, 327 F3d 1081, 1104 (10th Cir 2003) ("The elements of
federal mail fraud as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 1341 are (1) a scheme or artifice to defraud or obtain
property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises, (2) an intent to
defraud, and (3) use of the mails to execute the scheme.").
104 See United States v Dinome, 86 F3d 277, 284 (2d Cir 1996) (upholding jury instructions
emphasizing that the statute requires proof of intent to defraud); United States v Green, 745 F2d
1205, 1207 (9th Cir 1984) ("The government satisfies the requirement of proof of specific intent
under section 1341 if it proves the existence of a scheme which was 'reasonably calculated to
deceive persons of ordinary prudence and comprehension,' and this intention is shown by exam-
ining the scheme itself").
105 Green, 745 F2d at 1207.
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ing the scheme itself.' ' Conversely, a defendant charged under either
statute may use circumstantial evidence to show that he did not have
the requisite intent.'7 Additionally, in a charge involving mail or wire
fraud, the government need not prove the success of the scheme or
loss to the defrauded person.'n This is consistent with the purpose of
both statutes, which seek to prevent the use of the mails or wires in
any situation "where it is closely entwined with fraudulent activity.""
Consistent with courts' applications of the wire and mail fraud
statutes, a more reasonable construction of the Bank Fraud Act would
look at the totality of the defendant's actions, rather than a risk of loss,
to determine if the defendant had the specific intent necessary to
commit the crime of bank fraud. ° This totality approach, which would
examine the scheme itself, would best comport with modern interpre-
tations of the mail and wire fraud statutes.
The mail and wire fraud statutes seem to support an interpreta-
tion of § 1344(1) that does not require a risk of loss. The mail and wire
fraud's "intent to defraud" language has already been interpreted in a
way that supports the minority approach. That is, the government sat-
isfies the specific intent requirement under § 1344(1) as long as it
proves the existence of a scheme that is "reasonably calculated to de-
ceive persons of ordinary prudence and comprehension.,"' According
to interpretations of the mail and wire fraud statutes, the fraudulent
nature of the "scheme or artifice to defraud" should be measured by a
106 Id. See also United States v Berndt, 86 F3d 803,809 (8th Cir 1996) ("Intent is an essential
element of the crime of mail fraud,. . . but the jury may properly infer that intent from circum-
stantial evidence."); United States v Copple, 24 F3d 535, 545 (3d Cir 1994) ("Proving specific
intent in mail fraud cases is difficult, and, as a result, a liberal policy has developed to allow the
government to introduce evidence that even peripherally bears on the question of intent.");
United States v Ham, 998 F2d 1247, 1254 (4th Cir 1993) ("Fraudulent intent may be inferred from
the totality of the circumstances and need not be proven by direct evidence.").
107 See Copple, 24 F3d at 545 n 16 (noting that defendants can "introduce testimony of
collateral transactions that tend to negate the requisite intent"). In addition, it should be noted
that the McNeil court quoted language used by the Ninth Circuit in Green. McNeil, 320 F3d at
1039. The McNeil court implicitly used the parallel language of the mail and wire fraud statutes
to assist its interpretation of the bank fraud statute. Id.
108 United States v Pollack, 534 F2d 964,971 (DC Cir 1976).
109 United States v Halbert, 640 F2d 1000,1009 (9th Cir 1981).
110 In McNeil, the Ninth Circuit found that risk of loss was not necessary to prove specific
intent since a court could infer the specific intent needed for a fraud conviction by looking at the
whole scheme itself 320 F3d at 1039-40.
111 See text accompanying note 105. Additionally, the requisite level of intent can be shown
by examining the scheme itself. See McNeil, 320 F3d at 1039. See also United States v Saks, 964
F2d 1514, 1518 (5th Cir 1992) (holding that the requisite intent to defraud under the mail and
wire fraud statutes is established if the defendant acted knowingly and with specific intent to
deceive).
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nontechnical standard, giving courts ample leeway in criminalizing
conduct that threatens federal interests.12
In regards to section (2), the totality approach once again gains
support through the parallel language of the mail and wire fraud stat-
utes. The language the Ninth Circuit used in McNeil tracks very
closely the language other circuits use when interpreting the wire and
mail fraud statutes." For example, the McNeil court held that prosecu-
tors need only show that the defendants had engaged in a scheme rea-
sonably calculated to deceive or cheat a reasonable person in order to
warrant a § 1344(2) conviction. The court suggested the requisite
intent can be shown by examining the circumstances surrounding the
scheme itself." This is similar to the language used in United States v
Flynn,"6 where the Eighth Circuit held that the specific intent in wire
fraud "can be inferred from the facts and circumstances surrounding a
defendant's actions."1
Critics may question the use of interpretative guidance of the
mail and wire fraud statutes since a risk of civil liability or financial
loss is specific to the crime of bank fraud. Many mail and wire fraud
prosecutions do not involve banks. Thus, opponents of this approach
may argue that using the parallel language of the mail and wire fraud
statutes is inapposite since the courts interpreting those statutes have
not and could not directly speak to the issue of a risk of loss require-
ment. '
The fact that courts have not directly spoken to the risk of loss
requirement within the context of the mail and wire fraud statutes
112 United States v Louderman, 576 F2d 1383, 1388 (9th Cir 1978) (noting that nontechnical
standards guide a court's determination of the character of a particular representation under
§ 1343).
113 See Dinuome, 86 F3d at 281, 283-85 (holding that no actual harm need be proven to
show an illegal attempt to defraud under § 1341 and § 1343 and that a jury could examine the
whole scheme to determine whether fraudulent intent exists); Green, 745 F2d at 1207-08 (hold-
ing that an intent to deceive can be shown by examining the scheme itself).
114 McNeil, 320 F3d at 1039, citing Mason, 902 F2d at 1443. In McNeil, the court affirmed a
conviction for filing a false income tax return and depositing the refund in a bank. The bank did
not face any type of a loss or liability, but the court held that the defendant had misrepresented
himself as the John Doe on the check by opening the account and depositing the check in that
name. McNeil, 320 F3d at 1039.
115 Id.
116 196 F3d 927 (8th Cir 1999).
117 Id at 929.
118 Opponents may also point to the fact that some jurisdictions hold that specific intent can
only be established by proving the defendant contemplated actual harm against the victim. See
United States v Starr, 816 F2d 94,98 (2d Cir 1987) ("Only a showing of intended harm will satisfy
the element of fraudulent intent."). If analogized to the bank fraud act, this could lend support to
the view that a risk of loss is required. However, as interpretations of the mail and wire fraud
statutes have shown, circumstantial evidence can be used to show this contemplated harm. A risk
of loss may be one way of showing this harm, but is not a necessary precondition.
20051 1463
The University of Chicago Law Review
should not stop courts from using the interpretative guidance offered
by these statutes."9 When interpreting the bank fraud statute, courts
need to ask how they should determine the specific intent required
under § 1344. The mail and wire fraud statutes indicate that such in-
tent can be inferred by looking at the circumstantial evidence sur-
rounding the scheme. A victim's actual or potential losses through
wire fraud may be relevant in determining intent,"O but are not a nec-
essary precondition.' Similarly, though a risk of loss showing may
help prove the specific intent of a defendant on trial for bank fraud, it
should not be a requirement for conviction.
D. How Should We Interpret the Congressional Intent and Purpose
Behind the Statute?
The textual similarities between the mail and wire fraud statutes
and the Bank Fraud Act would seem to resolve the risk of loss debate
in favor of the totality approach. However, since the text is not explicit
in its recommendations, it is useful to ask whether the totality ap-
proach makes sense in light of the legislative history and the purposes
behind the statute. This section addresses two separate questions. First,
what was Congress's intent as it pertains to the risk of loss require-
ment? Second, does the totality approach comport with Congress's
purpose in enacting the statute? Specifically, does the totality ap-
proach, which is a more expansive interpretation of the Bank Fraud
Act, federalize state and local crimes and make the statute's reach
effectively limitless?
1. Congressional intent: an examination of the legislative history
surrounding the enactment of the Bank Fraud Act.
Supporters on both sides of the Bank Fraud Act debate have
used the Act's legislative history to solidify their positions." An ex-
119 The interpretations of specific intent under the mail and wire fraud acts should be used
to guide courts when they analyze the Bank Fraud Act. See Greenwood Trust Co v Massachu-
setts, 971 F2d 818,827 (1st Cir 1992) ("[lIt is ... a general rule that when Congress borrows lan-
guage from one statute and incorporates it into a second statute, the language of the two acts
should be interpreted the same way."). See also Felix Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Read-
ing of Statutes, 47 Colum L Rev 527, 537 (1947) ("[I]f a word is obviously transplanted from
another legal source, whether the common law or other legislation, it brings the old soil with
it.").
120 United States v DeSantis, 134 F3d 760, 768 (6th Cir 1998) (holding that the government
may introduce evidence of investor loss as proof of a defendant's specific intent to defraud).
121 United States v Christopher, 142 F3d 46, 52-53 (1st Cir 1998) (finding that the person
deceived does not have to be same person deprived of money or property by fraud).
122 By legislative history, this Comment refers to the House and Senate Committee Reports
accompanying the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984. As a rule of thumb, this is the
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amination of the House and Senate Committee Reports provides use-
ful insight into Congress's motivations and goals when it enacted
§ 1344. Two issues are of critical importance to the current debate.
First, as noted throughout the legislative history, Congress en-
acted the Bank Fraud Act to provide an effective vehicle for the
prosecution of frauds in which the victims are federally insured finan-
cial institutions.'" Congress sought to design a system that would pro-
tect the financial integrity of the federal banking system and ensure
federal prosecution of those who victimize banks through fraudulent
schemes.'24 This included the criminalization of acts that may threaten
the integrity of the federal banking system but do not place the victim
banks at a risk of loss or civil liability.'1
2
As a background matter, courts have disagreed about which
crimes actually threaten the financial integrity of banking institutions.
In Davis, the Seventh Circuit conceded that the defendant fraudu-
lently misrepresented himself to the bank when opening a bank ac-
126 
,2count. Technically, therefore, the bank was "defrauded.' 27 However,
because the real victim of fraud was the IRS, the crime did not fall
within the scope of § 1344(2). Since the bank had taken the IRS re-
fund as a holder in due course, the bank was not placed at risk for any
liability.' The statute's purpose, the court noted, was not necessarily to
protect individual victims of fraud but to protect the federal govern-
ment and its interest as an insurer of the nation's financial institu-
tions."'
However, not all crimes that threaten the nation's financial insti-
tutions produce a risk of loss. The legislative history contains numer-
most accurate type of legislative history since it speaks most closely to congressional intent.
Indeed, instead of reading the entire bill, Senators, Congressmen, and their staffers often just
read the committee reports in order to understand the legislation for which they are voting.
James Landis, A Note on "Statutory Interpretation," 43 Harv L Rev 886, 888-89 (1930) ("Through
the committee report, the explanation of the committee chairman, and otherwise, a mere expres-
sion of assent [when other members vote for a bill] becomes in reality a concurrence in the
expressed views of another.") (internal citations omitted). See also Harry Willmer Jones, Extrin-
sic Aids in the Federal Courts, 25 Iowa L Rev 737, 748-49 (1940) (noting the important role of
"committee specialization" in the legislative process). Further down on the hierarchy of legisla-
tive material are the statements of individual legislators. Using this type of legislative history is
not recommended since it opens the door for enterprising judges to pick and choose floor testi-
mony in order to bolster their arguments. Id at 750-51.
123 S Rep No 98-225 at 377 (cited in note 2) (noting the need for "[flederal jurisdiction over
crimes committed against federally insured ... financial institutions").
124 Id.
125 The legislative history specifically refers to insider trading in circumstances where there
is no loss to the financial institution. See note 133 and accompanying text.
126 989 F2d at 246.
127 Id.
128 Id at 245-47.
129 Id at 247.
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ous references to crimes that are to be reached under the statute but
that do not necessarily cause financial institutions to face a risk of loss
or liability.'O Prior to § 1344's enactment, Congress recognized various
gaps in the federal law concerning crimes against banks.3' In fact, both
the House and the Senate noted various fraudulent schemes they
wished to combat with the enactment of the bank fraud statute.'32
Many of these schemes were for crimes that did not expose financial
institutions to a risk of loss.
For example, the House Report found that insider trading was
not prosecutable in many instances unless "there [was a resulting] loss
to the institution.' 33 In addition, the Senate Judiciary Committee
noted a need for a general bank fraud statute to combat crimes of
common law larceny where "there is not a 'taking and carrying' away
of [property]."'-" Money laundering may not actually expose a bank to
a risk of loss, but may still victimize banks and be in step with congres-
sional intent to go after crimes regardless of the resulting loss to the
institution. These statements support the argument that Congress
wanted to enact a statute to cover situations where an institution did
not incur an actual or a potential risk of loss. The evidence suggests
Congress wanted § 1344 to be broad and multifaceted, so as to tackle
various types of fraud against financial institutions.
Second, the financial integrity and vitality of the banking system
depends on the ability of the federal government to prosecute any
type of fraud directed at federally backed financial institutions. The
Ninth Circuit implicitly recognized this principle in McNeil. Even
though the IRS may have been the main victim of the defendant's
scheme, the use of a federally insured bank as a conduit of crime
threatened the integrity of the national banking system. '3'
130 This is an issue that has not been examined by any of the circuit courts.
131 See HR Rep No 98-901 at 2 (cited in note 16).
132 Id. See also S Rep No 98-225 at 377 (cited in note 2).
133 HR Rep No 98-901 at 2 (cited in note 16).
134 S Rep No 98-225 at 378 (cited in note 2).
135 See McNeil, 320 F2d at 1037 ("Even though McNeil's ultimate goal was to obtain funds
from the IRS, bank fraud charges may lie even if the bank is not the immediate or sole victim of
the defendant's conduct."). Again, in United States v Everett, 270 F3d 986 (6th Cir 2001), the Sixth
Circuit has taken a more nuanced approach as to which crimes threaten the integrity of financial
institutions. Id at 991. Although in agreement that a risk of loss requirement is not necessary for
a § 1344(2) conviction, the court found that in the event such a rule was required, a bank convic-
tion could be sustained under § 1344(2) in all instances where a bank was defrauded into trans-
ferring moneys under its control. Id. This is because any scheme that causes a bank to transfer
funds would necessarily make those funds unavailable for use in everyday banking operations,
such as securing loans. Thus, financially and economically, any fraud upon a bank would "almost
inevitably [cause] it some loss." See id.
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2. The totality approach and its consistency with the Act's
purpose.
The totality approach faces the same criticism that courts have
leveled against the mail and wire fraud statutes. Such criticism centers
on concerns of federalism due to the statutes' far-reaching effects and
their apparent lack of limitation.76 Many of these concerns, though
valid, overstate the problem. Congress intended that the fraud statutes
be given a liberal construction in order to effectively deal with crimes
that have a federal impact.
a) Does an expansive interpretation of the bank fraud statute make
the statute's reach limitless? The original purpose of the mail fraud
statute was to protect the mail from being used as a vehicle for coun-
terfeiters, illegal schemes, and forgeries.", Since its enactment the
scope of the statute has increased dramatically. Prosecutors have used
the Mail Fraud Act to protect a company's confidential business in-
formation, 1  as well as a citizen's right to a fair and honest govern-
ment." The concern is that "[a] limitless reading of the mail fraud
statute could result in a kind of federal criminal common law, that is, a
situation where a person could be convicted of a crime against the
United States despite the conduct not violating an express statutory
provision."' '
Such is the fear with the bank fraud statute. Absent a risk of loss
requirement, courts may have difficulty limiting the reach of the stat-
ute to insure prosecution of crimes that only directly impact the integ-
rity of the country's financial institutions. For example, in McNeil, the
Ninth Circuit upheld the defendant's bank fraud conviction even
though his crime involved more of a fraud against the government
than against the bank."' In fact, the court noted that bank fraud
charges may lie even when a bank is not the immediate or intended
victim of a defendant's conduct. 2 The bank in McNeil was only an
136 See Peter J. Henning, Maybe It Should Just Be Called Federal Fraud: The Changing
Nature of the Mail Fraud Statute, 36 BC L Rev 435, 437 (1995) (arguing that the statute has be-
come the primary provision to extend federal jurisdiction to crimes traditionally prosecuted at
the state and local level); Geraldine Szott Moohr, Mail Fraud Meets Criminal Theory, 67 U Cin L
Rev 1, 3 (1998) (noting the evolution of the Mail Fraud Act from "initially protect[ing] money or
property rights to ... protect[ing] rights in honest services and intangible property").
137 Brian C. Behrens, Comment, 18 US. C. § 1341 and § 1346: Deciphering the Confusing
Letters of the Mail Fraud Statute, 13 SLU Pub L Rev 489,490,492-93 (1993).
138 See, for example, Carpenter v United States, 484 US 19,25 (1987).
139 See 18 USC § 1346 (2000).
140 United States v Brown, 79 F3d 1550, 1556-57 (11th Cir 1996). For another view on the far
reach of the mail and wire fraud statutes, see note 98.
141 McNeil, 320 F3d at 1037 ("[T]he bank was not merely an unwitting instrumentality of a
scheme to defraud the IRS, it was also a victim.").
142 Id.
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incidental player in the scheme. In this case it is difficult to see, absent
a risk of loss requirement, what limits the federal government's use of
the Bank Fraud Act for a wide variety of crimes for which it was not
originally intended.
Although valid, these concerns are overblown and may not be in
line with the purposes behind the act. In interpreting the mail fraud
statute, courts have found that the use of the mails need not be indis-
pensable to the success of a scheme to defraud, but can merely be an
incidental step to the fraud' 3 The same reasoning should hold true for
the Bank Fraud Act.
In addition, due to the increasingly complex nature of crimes
against financial institutions and the ever-changing face of technology,
an expansive interpretation would give prosecutors flexibility to at-
tack crimes against financial institutions. The mail and wire fraud stat-
utes are often used as a "first line of defense," or "stop-gap" device,
permitting the prosecution of newly invented frauds until Congress
enacts legislation to cope with the new crime.'" Congress noted the
statute's potential as a stop-gap defense when it was passed; Congress
was facing new types of fraudulent schemes that it was unable to han-
dle effectively.'4 The Bank Fraud Act provided a valuable "jurisdic-
tional hook" for federal prosecutors to deal with new types of
crimes." Additionally, federal prosecutors always have an option not
to prosecute; thus, if they find that the new fraudulent activity does
not sufficiently implicate federal interests, they may decide to expend
their resources elsewhere and leave the resolution of the issue to state
and local authorities.
b) Does an expansive interpretation of the bank fraud statute fed-
eralize state and local crimes? A corollary to the concern of the stat-
ute's limitless reach is the argument that the federal government
should not prosecute crimes that are easily reachable under state law.
The Second Circuit took this position in United States v Blackmon.I
7
In Blackmon, the defendant faced charges under the bank fraud stat-
143 United States v Brocksmith, 991 F2d 1363, 1367 (7th Cir 1993). See also Pereira v United
States, 347 US 1 (1954) (holding that the mail fraud statute was violated when a defendant de-
frauded a victim and attempted to cash a check drawn from an out-of-state bank, causing the
mails to be used as part of the bank's check-clearing procedures).
144 United Sates v Czubinski, 106 F3d 1069, 1079 (1st Cir 1997) (concluding that mail and
wire fraud statutes "can address new forms of serious crime that fail to fall within more specific
legislation"). See also Shah, 40 Am Crim L Rev at 826 (cited in note 100).
145 Shah, 40 Am Crim L Rev at 827 (cited in note 100).
146 Compare United States v Sawyer, 85 F3d 713, 723 n 5 (1st Cir 1996) (referring to the
mailing element of the statute as a "hook" to secure federal jurisdiction).
147 839 F2d 900,905 (2d Cir 1988) ("Congress did not intend the bank fraud statute to cover
ordinary state law offense&").
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ute for his involvement in a "pigeon drop scheme."" Though the de-
fendants asked the victims to withdraw money from their accounts,
and in effect removed property under the control of the bank, the
bank was not victimized by the scheme.149 The federal interest in the
integrity of the banking system was not at risk. l  Instead, the court
noted that expansive use of the bank fraud statute may implicate fed-
eralism concerns because state law already criminalized the scheme."'
The court offered the example of the Travel Act,' 2 and stated that the
expansive application of that statute "to activity 'traditionally subject
to state regulation ... would alter sensitive federal-state relationships'
and 'could overextend limited federal police resources.'.. 3 The fear is
that federal prosecutors will use the bank fraud statute in the same
expansive way as they have the mail and wire fraud statutes, as a
cheap tool to gain federal jurisdiction over crimes that are more prop-
erly handled at the state level.
Again, though valid, these concerns are exaggerated. Congress
specifically endorsed the expansive use of the wire and mail fraud
statutes and crafted the bank fraud statute in hopes that it would re-
ceive the same expansive interpretation.'"4 At the time of the bank
fraud statute's enactment, the mail and wire fraud acts already had a
very expansive reach. Had Congress been concerned about federalism
or prosecutorial overreach, it could have limited the statute's reach
during its enactment. Congress must have known that the use of parallel
language would mean the statutes would have the same broad reach.'
148 Id at 902. A pigeon drop scheme is a "street confidence game." In Blackmon,
the game involved persuading wealthy elderly women that they had "found" cash ear-
marked for Iran or the PLO, and then convincing the women to withdraw their own money
from banks in an amount equivalent to their "share" of the found cash, convert that money
into foreign currency, and give the foreign currency to the appellants for high-return foreign
investment. The victims, of course, never saw either their share of the found money or their
own money again.
Id at 902-03. See United States v Jones, 648 F Supp 225,226-28 (SD NY 1986), for a more color-
ful account of the details.
149 Blackmon, 839 F2d at 903. Compare United States v Lankford, 573 F2d 1051, 1053-54(8th Cir 1978) (finding that, when property is deposited in a bank, the bank owes its depositors a
duty of care regarding certain potential risks in order to protect those using its services).
150 Blackmon, 839 F2d at 906.
151 Id.
152 18 USC § 1952 (2000).
153 Blackmon, 839 F2d at 906, quoting Rewis v United States, 401 US 808, 812 (1971). Con-
sider Roger J. Miner, Federal Courts, Federal Crime, and Federalism, 10 Harv J L & Pub Pol 117,
124-27 (1987) (discussing the use of federal police resources and duplicative law enforcement
when federal officers take over state investigations).
154 HR Rep No 98-901 at 4 (cited in note 16).
155 Consider id (suggesting that Congress knew and understood that a broad interpretation
of the Act's language would result).
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All evidence points to the fact that Congress did not want the courts
to cabin the reach of the Bank Fraud Act, but instead wanted to keep
its reach in accordance with modern day interpretations of the mail
and wire fraud statutes.
Additionally, as the First Circuit noted in United States v Bran-
don" "[f]inancial transactions are becoming increasingly integrated
and complex as more and more financial instruments are securitized
and traded on national and global markets," and that, "[c]onsequently,
the effects of fraudulent actions against one institution are increas-
ingly likely to spill over and detrimentally affect others..".. This posi-
tion does not advocate the federalization of criminal transactions pre-
viously covered only by state law, it simply "recogniz[es] that those
criminal transactions are becoming more federal in nature.""'
Rather than federalizing state and local crimes, the concern
should be that the loss approach would lead to judges peering into the
realm of state and local law, increasing the likelihood of judicial error.
For example, the McNeil court noted the difficulty judges would have
in determining whether the bank would be held civilly liable for fal-
ling victim to fraud or misrepresentations.' It would most likely not
be in line with congressional purposes for federal bank fraud liability
to "turn on the correct application of state commercial law and possi-
ble subsequent state-court adjudication."' ' Indeed, the Davis court
looked to the Illinois state revenue code and the Uniform Commer-
cial Code to determine if the bank would face a risk of civil liability.6'
This seems an unreasonable exercise for judges to undertake, and
could mean white collar criminal prosecutions would shift in response
to the changing tunes of state commercial banking law. Reliance on
state laws could make prosecuting these crimes very difficult since
prosecutors would have to know various state commercial law provi-
sions. It may also be burdensome for defendants since they would not
have proper notice of each state's bank fraud laws. Though courts of-
ten look at state laws when deciding important questions of federal
law, the totality approach advocated by the Sixth and Ninth Circuits
would simplify the process and could reduce judicial error.
Congress rejected a similar rationale when it enacted the Bank
Fraud Act. Congress wanted to avoid situations where a federal inter-
est was vindicated on the basis of whether the fraudulent activity in
156 17 F3d 409 (1st Cir 1994).
157 Id at 427.
158 Id.
159 320 F3d at 1038.
160 See id.
161 989 F2d at 246-47.
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question is a violation of some other bank statute; thus, the bank fraud
statute was enacted to provide for a more unitary approach to tackling
bank fraud."'
CONCLUSION
In the years to come the federal government will face increas-
ingly complex financial crimes directed at financial institutions. These
crimes will not be simply local in nature, but will be increasingly na-
tional and global in scale, affecting our entire economic system. Prose-
cutors must have the power and the flexibility to protect the nation's
banking system. This Comment shows how the absence of a risk of
loss requirement in the Bank Fraud Act will address that need.
Neither the statutory language nor legislative history provide an
adequate resolution to the problem courts face in their interpretation
of the bank fraud statute. Though noted by circuit courts as the model
for the Bank Fraud Act, the mail and wire fraud statutes have not
been a model of interpretation. However, by looking at the analogous
mail and wire fraud statutes, this Comment lends credence to the to-
tality approach adopted by the Sixth and Ninth Circuits. The analysis
makes it clear that § 1344 does not, and should not, require the gov-
ernment to prove the victim bank was exposed to a risk of loss or civil
liability. Such an approach will give prosecutors the needed flexibility
necessary to aggressively protect the financial integrity of the federal
banking system.
162 S Rep No 98-225 at 377 (cited in note 2).
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